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Using data on more than 56,000 enterprises in 90 
countries, this paper finds that objective conditions in 
the business environment vary substantially across firms 
of different sizes and that there are important non-
linearities in their impact on employment growth. The 
paper focuses on four areas: access to finance, business 
regulations, corruption, and infrastructure. The results, 
particularly on the impacts of finance and corruption 
on growth, depend on whether and how the analysis 
accounts for the possible endogeneity of the business 
environment. Controlling for endogeneity revises the 
finding that small firms benefit most from access to 
This paper—a product of the Growth and the Macroeconomics Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger 
effort in the department to understand the microeconomics of growth. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on 
the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at mhallward@worldbank.org.  
finance, particularly for sources of finance associated 
with investment and growth. The findings are also 
sensitive to how “small” is defined. Differentiating micro 
(less than 10 employees) from other small firms shows 
that, while small firms can be disadvantaged in such an 
environment, micro firms tend to be proportionally less 
affected by a weak business climate—and, on occasion, 
it can help them to grow. Overall, allowing different size 
classifications provides insights into the impact of the 
business environment that are lost in more aggregate 
analyses. 
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An issue of particular relevance for economic growth is how the development of markets 
and institutions influences the growth of firms. This issue is even more important in 
developing countries, where markets and institutional infrastructure are less developed.  A 
related concern is whether an adverse business environment affects the efficiency and the 
dynamism of the business sector.   
This paper uses firm- level data on more than 56,000 enterprises in 85 developing 
countries and 5 high-income economies to assess the effects of the broader business 
environment on employment growth by firms, focusing on differences across firm size.  This 
paper is related to two strands of literature. First it relates to recent studies (Restuccia and 
Rogerson (2008), Hsieh and Klenow (2008)) that show that there is considerable resource 
misallocation across firms, which is driven by firm specific distortions. While these studies 
are silent about the nature of the distortions, they show such distortions lead to substantial 
aggregate productivity losses, and that differences in the degree of distortions would explain 
a significant portion of why India and China exhibit lower manufacturing productivity than 
the United States. This paper examines differences in business environment across firm size, 
and therefore it helps to provide a better understanding of which dimensions of the business 
environment matter and the heterogeneity of distortions across firms.    
This paper is also related to a number of studies that assess the effect of different 
dimensions of the business environment on firms’ performance.  Several studies in the 
literature examine the effect of employment regulations on firms’ adjustment and on labor 
market outcomes more generally.
1 Others look at the effect of regulations of entry of firms 
on firm creation and growth.
2 A number of them investigate the importance of access to 
finance for firm development and growth.
3 Overall, these studies indicate that regulations on 
labor, entry barriers for firms, and financing conditions can have a direct impact on firms’ 
                                                 
1 A few recent examples are: Botero et al. (2004), Besley and Burgess (2004), Almeida and Carneiro (2009), 
Haltiwanger, Scarpetta and Schweiger (2006), Micco and Pagés (2006), Petrin and Sivadasan (2006) and 
Autor, Kerr and Kugler (2007).  
2 For example: Djankov et al (2002) and  Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2004).  
3 For example: Demirgüç-Kunt  and Maksimovic (1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (2005), Galindo and Micco (2007).   3
employment decisions.  However, other aspects of the business environment can affect these 
decisions as well, raising costs and risks associated with doing business or by creating 
barriers to competition.  By affecting the overall growth prospects, issues from the quality of 
infrastructure, the strength of property rights, the nature and enforcement of business 
regulations and the overall openness in the management of public resources can all affect 
firms’ growth (World Bank, 2004). This paper looks at the joint and relative importance of a 
number of dimensions of the business environment on firms’ growth.  
Unlike most existing studies which rely on variation in business environment 
conditions across countries, sectors or sub-national territories (states), this paper exploits 
firm level data on the business environment conditions faced by firms. Yet, there are a 
number of methodological issues that need to be addressed, including potential measurement 
error, omitted variable bias and endogeneity.  To minimize the risk of the first two problems, 
the analysis is conducted with full set of sector-survey interaction dummies. In addition to 
controlling for some potentially important omitted variables, and measurement errors, they 
also control for survey differences and differences in demand conditions.   In addition, 
incorporating multiple dimensions of the broader business environment simultaneously deals 
seriously with concerns of omitted variable bias of papers that include only a single 
dimension, such as labor regulations or finance. 
To address potential endogeneity, this paper uses location-sector-size averages 
(minus individual firms’ own responses) of the business environment measures rather than 
individual firms’ own responses. The paper shows that there is a large potential degree of 
endogeneity in individual responses and that the results vary considerably if such 
endogeneity is not accounted for.  The paper also makes the point that how these averages 
enter into the regressions matters greatly.  Using the location-sector-size average does not 
necessarily address the endogeneity problem – if the averages used are based on current size.  
As objective conditions can be more challenging for smaller firms (e.g. smaller firms are 
less likely to access finance and more likely to pay bribes), assigning firms that grow 
substantially their current more favorable IC conditions, rather than those faced by firms of 
their initial size, can introduce a mechanical relationship between employment growth and 
many of the IC measures.  Matching the averaged indicators to initial size is needed to avoid   4
this problem.  This methodological contribution is most visible in estimating the effects of 
access to finance and corruption, which are the two areas where endogeneity is most likely. 
Using firm level data allows us to focus on the question of whether the impact of the 
business environment is neutral across firm size.  Market failures or policy created 
distortions can create fixed costs in the operation of businesses, creating cost disadvantages 
for smaller firms (see Tybout 2000 for review of issues). The costs of dealing with credit 
market information imperfections or with a complex and non-transparent regulatory 
environment are some examples of such non-linearities. Large firms may also have more 
political influence and shape regulations and policies in their favor.  On the other hand, 
smaller firms may benefit from lax enforcement of regulations or lower harassment from 
corrupt public officials. Across the world, a sizeable amount of public resources are devoted 
to the development of micro, small and medium firms, yet unlocking potential constraints to 
their performance is another, perhaps equally effective, development strategy. The main 
objective of this paper is to assess whether there are heterogeneous effects of unlocking 
business environment constraints.  
Differential effects across firms of different size can stem from two sources.  First, 
there can be differences in the underlying objective conditions faced by firms.  The paper 
focuses on the effect of four areas of the business environment: access to finance, the 
regulatory environment, corruption and access to infrastructure.   Second, the same 
conditions can potentially have differential or non-linear effects on employment growth by 
size.  Thus, it could be that the same extent of external finance is more beneficial to smaller 
firms or that the same extent of power outages is less damaging to larger firms because they 
have access to generators. 
The paper finds evidence of both effects.  The paper does find that micro and small 
firms have less access to formal finance, face significantly greater interruptions in 
infrastructure services, and pay more in bribes—as a percentage of sales—than do larger 
firms.  In turn, larger firms spend significantly more time dealing with officials and red tape.  
The results indicate significant non linearities across firm size in the impact of these 
conditions too.  A lack of finance and poor infrastructure reduce the growth of medium and 
large firms. Business regulations affect mostly the growth of small firms, which seemingly 
prefer to remain small to keep below the radar of regulators.    5
The results also show the importance of distinguishing between micro (less than 10 
employees) and small firms (10-49 employees). By refining the definition of small firms, the 
message is refined to show that while small firms can face more challenging conditions, the 
very small or micro firms can actually benefit—in relative, and in some cases even in 
absolute, terms—from an adverse business environment.  This can potentially explain why 
very small firms account for a larger share of employment in countries with an adverse 
business climate.  
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 
describes the data.  Section 4 examines how objective business conditions vary by types of 
firms, emphasizing the different patterns across different sizes of firms.  Including lagged 
performance variables in these regressions reinforces the need to address endogeneity—and 
indicate the likely directions that employment growth might have on different dimensions of 
the business environment. Section 5 describes the impact of objective conditions on 
employment growth using location-sector-size averages instead of individual firm responses.  
Section 6 conducts a number of robustness checks.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
There is a growing literature that assesses the effects of the set of factors, policies and 
institutions, commonly known as business environment or investment climate, on the 
performance of firms and economic growth. The methodologies used by these studies are 
very diverse. A number of studies have focused on cross-country variation to identify the 
effect of labor regulations (Botero et al, 2004; Heckman and Pagés, 2004), regulation of 
entry (Djankov et al., 2002) or a wide set of regulations (Loayza, Oviedo and Servén, 2006).  
These studies relate objective (de jure) measures of regulation at the country level to 
aggregate country outcomes. Although the results are suggestive of the importance of 
appropriate regulations for business development, they suffer from important 
methodological constraints ranging from omitted variable bias to endogeneity concerns.  
Another group of studies employ a difference-in-differences method first developed 
by Rajan and Zingales (1998). These studies analyze the effect of different aspects of the 
business environment at the country-industry level. They show that financially dependent   6
industries grow faster in financially developed markets (Rajan and Zingales (1998)), and 
that firms in industries dominated by small firms grow faster in more financially developed 
markets (Beck et al. (2008)). Studies have also found that industries in which entry is more 
important exhibit less growth in countries with restrictions to firm entry ( Klapper, Laeven 
and Rajan (2004)). Finally, Micco and Pagés (2006) show that industries that are inherently 
more volatile create fewer jobs and are less developed in countries with very restrictive 
hiring and firing regulations.  
While improving on cross-country studies, the former studies suffer from three 
potential shortcomings that can be addressed in our study.  First, in most cases variation in 
business environment conditions is captured with country level variables that reflect de jure 
regulations or conditions, that is, the procedures and costs that would be incurred if firms 
fully complied with what is on the books.  However, there can be large gaps between what is 
on the books and what is experienced on the ground.  This is particularly true in lower 
income countries and those with higher levels of corruption. (Hallward-Driemeier and 
Aterido (2007); Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007)).  In that regard, it is desirable to 
have measures of de facto regulation.  
Second, it is important to explore variation in the business environment not only 
across countries but also within country boundaries—across sub-national areas and 
especially, across firm size and ownership.
4  Having disaggregated variables allows for 
hypotheses to be tested without having to assume that one country is the benchmark or 
“best” case against which to compare other countries.   
Third, while most studies look at the effects of individual dimensions of the 
investment climate, our focus is on regressions that combine multiple dimensions in a single 
regression.  This not only addresses potential bias in the estimates, it allows us to test 
directly which dimensions have the biggest impact on firm performance. 
A number of recent studies make use of the World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES)
 5—a firm-level dataset with 4,000 firms across 54 countries—to study the effect of 
                                                 
4 A few studies assess differences in business environment conditions within countries. Besley and Burgess 
(2004) and Ahsan and Pagés (2009) exploit differences in labor market regulations across Indian states to 
assess how different labor market regulations affect economic performance across Indian states.  Almeida and 
Carneiro (2009) assess the effect of variation of enforcement in labor regulations within Brazil.  
5 Despite their similar names, the World Business Environment Survey (WBES), a one off survey in 1999, is 
not part of the larger and ongoing World Bank firm survey effort, the Enterprise Surveys (ES).  The earlier   7
the business environment on firm growth. Using subjective firm-level data measures of the 
business environment these studies show the importance of finance, corruption and property 
rights (Batra, Kaufman and Stone, 2003; Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2006). 
Some other studies examine the relationship between business environment and firm growth 
using the newer Enterprise Survey, but for individual or small groups of countries (Dollar, 
Hallward-Driemeier and Megistae, 2005, for India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and China; Fisman 
and Svensson, 2007, and Rienikka and Svensson, 2002, for Uganda; and Bigsten and 
Soderbom, 2006, which reviews the literature for Africa). 
A central area of focus for this paper is whether there are significant differences in 
the impact across firm types, particularly by firm size.  The literature has largely examined 
this issue with regard to access to finance, generally finding smaller firms are more 
constrained (Galindo and Micco, 2007; Clark, Dollar, and Micco, 2004; Love and Mylenko 
2005).  Beck et al. (2005) is of particular interest here, as these authors include additional 
measures of corruption and property rights using the WBES firm-level dataset.  Using firms’ 
perceptions on potential constraints, they also find patterns across countries, with small 
firms benefiting most from greater financial and institutional development.   
Our work expands on this literature in several dimensions.  This paper nearly 
doubles the number of countries covered, with country samples approximately five to 10 
times larger.   Whereas Beck et al. (2005) use subjective firm responses as measures of the 
business environment at the firm level, we use objective measures (i.e., time spent with 
officials dealing with permits and licenses rather than a ranking of how burdensome red tape 
is on a scale of 1-5).  Beck et al (2005) include a final table to address potential endogeneity 
of business environment conditions on firm growth using location-size averages of 
responses as instruments.  However, as the averages are based on current size, we show that 
this strategy does not actually address endogeneity.  Once we control for endogeneity, 
matching average conditions based on initial size, we no longer find that smaller firms 
benefit most from improved access to finance.  We also use narrower bands on firm size 
categories, which lead to some interesting extensions on their results, and look at how 
results vary across country groupings, focusing on measures of institutional development.   
                                                                                                                                                      
round primarily collected perception data regarding constraints and some information on firm performance.  In 
some regions firms only provided information on their employment range, i.e., small, medium, large, making it 
impossible to use that data to study differences between small firms below and above 10 employees.   8
 
 
3. The Data  
 
Our study is primarily based on the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (ES), a newly available 
collection of firm-level datasets for developing countries as well as a limited number of 
high-income countries.
6  Questionnaires are administered within a framework of common 
guidelines in the design and implementation.
7 The dataset is assembled using the core 
survey, which is a module of identical questions included in all questionnaires, thereby 
enabling cross-country analyses.  
While in principle, the dataset contains information for approximately 80,000 firms 
in more than 110 countries, complete data for the variables used in our estimations are 
available for a subsample of approximately 56,000 firms in 90 countries in seven different 
regions surveyed during the period 2000-2006. For some countries more than one survey is 
available.
8 (See Table A1 in the Appendix for a complete list of countries and surveys 
available, as well as the number of observations in each country.) The median sample size is 
350 firms, with several large countries having substantially larger samples (Brazil, China, 
India, Turkey and Vietnam have samples over 1,500). The sample of firms in each country 
is stratified by size, sector and location.
9 Because of this stratification, large enterprises are 
in general over-sampled in the ESs compared to their share in the number of firms, but not 
in terms of their contribution to GDP. The unit of analysis is the “Establishment” in the 
manufacturing and service sectors.
10  Most firms are registered with local authorities, 
although they may be only in partial compliance with labor and tax authorities. Unlike most 
                                                 
6  The terms Enterprise Surveys includes surveys that have been implemented regionally under other names, 
such as includes BEEPS, Investment Climate Surveys and RPED surveys (World Bank 2004b and World Bank 
2007).  
7 From http://rru.worldbank.org/InvestmentClimate/Methodology.aspx 
8 While efforts are shifting to building a panel dataset, most repeat surveys have been additional cross-sections.  
There are approximately 2,000 firms that enter twice in the dataset. 
9 From http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Methodology/default.aspx#weights: ES have been conducted 
following simple random sampling or random stratified sampling. In a simple random sample, all members of 
the population have the same probability of being selected and no weighting of the observations is necessary. 
In a stratified random sample, all population units are grouped within homogeneous groups and simple random 
samples are selected within each group 
10 In Europe and Central Asia, the unit is the “firm.” In all other regions it is the plant or establishment.  As 
over 90 percent are single-plant firms, the distinction is not likely to affect the results.   9
firm-level datasets, this data spans the manufacturing and service sectors. Approximately 61 
percent of the observations reflect establishments in manufacturing, while the rest are in the 
service sector. 
The World Bank enterprise survey data was developed to provide information on 
firms’ performance as well as on aspects of the investment climate faced by firms. 
Regarding firms’ performance, the dataset contains information on a number of variables 
such as current employment, investment, or sales. It also contains retrospective information 
for these three variables, in most cases for up to three periods before the year of reference of 
the survey, but in some few cases only for two or one period before. We focus on the 
employment level or growth of permanent workers as our outcome variables of interest. We 
do not include other forms of employment, such as contract labor or temporary workers 
because there are differences in the consistency of reporting of total employment (i.e. 
permanent plus temporary) across some countries. Other important, additional, reasons to 
focus on the level and growth of permanent employment are that these variables are more 
likely to reflect the long-run performance of the firm, and their evolution is of higher 
concern for  policymakers, as non permanent forms of employment tend to be considered as 
substandard or less preferred by workers.   
Following Davis and Haltiwanger (1992, 1999), our measure of employment growth 
refers to the change of permanent employment during the period t and three years before, 
divided by the firm’s simple average of permanent employment during the same period.
11  
The measure is symmetric around zero and bounded by values -2, and +2 and while 
monotonically related to the conventional growth rate and a second order approximation of 
the logarithmic first difference, it allows computing meaningful growth rates for firms 
suffering sharp expansions or contractions, avoiding any arbitrary treatment of outliers. This 
is quite useful, because even when by construction our sample does not register firm exit, 
some firms experience sharp changes in employment due to its early/late stage of 
                                                 
11 For firms that have been in business less than four years, we compute employment growth based on a two 
year difference, or if in business for only two years, one year difference.  We then define controls EG(s) as one 
if we have computed employment growth s years apart, and zero otherwise and include these variables in our 
growth estimates to account for such differences in our estimations.   10
development.
12 Young, small firms may experience very large growth in their labor force; 
Bankrupt firms or firms on the verge of closure may suffer very large contractions prior to 
their final exit from the market. Due to differences in data availability, employment growth 
refers to different periods for different firms. We account for this difference in the period of 
reference in our empirical specifications.   
The data also contains subjective and objective information on the business climate 
faced by individual firms, reflecting conditions at the time of the survey (period t). 
Regarding objective measures, the ones we focus on in this study, the dataset contains a set 
of measurements relative to various aspects of the investment climate as they are being 
experienced by the firm. We focus on three measures of access to finance and two measures 
of each of remaining three areas of the business climate. (See Table 2 for a description and 
summary statistics of these variables). We measure access to finance, by means of the share 
of investment financed with funds external to the firm (sh-invest-fin) or alternatively, with 
the share of working capital financed externally (sh-work-cap) or the share of sales on credit 
(sh_sales_cr)  The sample means of those two variables are 21, 20 and 42 percent, 
respectively.   
We measure business regulatory conditions with the percentage of time managers 
(mng-time) devote to dealing with authorities, or alternatively with the days firms devote to 
inspections.  On average, firms spent 8.9 percent of their time dealing with government 
authorities, and almost 16 days dealing with inspections during the year previous to the 
survey.  We measure the extent of corruption by means of either a dummy variable (bribe y-
n) which captures whether a firm had to pay a bribe  or the percentage of sales paid on 
bribes during the year previous to the sample (bribe %). To minimize the amount of sub-
reporting the survey inquires about the amount paid in bribes by asking: “How much do 
firms similar to yours pay in bribes in order to get things done?”  The survey means show a 
considerable incidence of corruption: 42 percent of firms declare having paid bribes, with an 
average amount of 1.5 percent of sales paid.  Finally, we capture the extent of infrastructure 
bottlenecks by measuring the number of days firms remained without power service (days-
no power) as well as the share of the average cargo’s value lost while in transit (losstransit 
                                                 
12 In principle, our sample allows identifying new entrants, i.e. firms that have been in business one year or 
less.  However, as the sampling frame can be a year or two old, there is an under-representation of new 
entrants.    11
%) during the last year. Again, the survey means show non-negligible bottlenecks, with an 
average of 38 days during the year previous to the survey without power service, and 1.5 % 
of sales lost during transit.   
Finally, the dataset also includes information on a number of firm characteristics 
such as size, age, location, export activity, ownership, and sector. This is an important 
feature of the data, which allows expanding previous aggregate cross-country analyses 
attempting to assess the economic impact of different aspects of the business climate to an 
analysis of whether business environment conditions differ across, and affect differently, 
different types of firms. The firm characteristics used in this study include: four size classes 
(micro 1-10 permanent employees, small 11-50, medium 51-200 and large  more than 200,); 
three age categories (young 1-5 years, mature 6-15, and older–more than 15); two location 
types (smallcity or cities with less than 1 million or more and largecity, i.e capital cities  or 
with  one million or more) ownership (whether foreign or government represents 10 percent 
or more of ownership); whether the firm is an exporter (10 percent or more of sales); and a 
two-digit industry classification.  
  The sample contains a large proportion of micro and small establishments (39 
percent micro and 34 percent small firms), with size measured with retrospective data 
generally referring to three years before the current period.
13 Only 11 percent are large 
firms. The sample also consists largely of young firms, with age also referred to the initial 
period for which information for a firm is available. Table A2 shows that 31 percent of firms 
in our sample were five or fewer years old, and 38 percent were between six and 15 years).  
According to the 10-percent thresholds noted above, 11 percent of the firms are foreign-
owned, and 23 percent of firms are exporters.  
The sample is well diversified across regions; 27.2 percent of the sample corresponds 
to East Europe and Central Asian countries; 20.9 percent of firms in sample are from Latin 
American and the Caribbean; 16 percent are from sub-Saharan Asia, 14.5 percent from East 
Asia and 10.2 percent from South Asia (see Table A.2 in the Annex). There is a smaller, but 
still significant representation of North Africa and the Middle East region (6.7 percent) and 
high income European countries (4.6 percent). 
                                                 
13 In some cases the reference period is less than 3 years due to firm age or data availability.   12
  Table 1 reports the mean and standard deviation of the employment growth measure 
across firm size with size measured as the initial size (three, two, or one year ago). There is 
positive employment growth across all firm sizes except for larger firms, which on average 
experience negative growth. The average firm level employment growth, according to our 
measure, is 12 %. Micro firms grew over the average, while small and medium growth was 
below average.  
 
4. Variations in Objective Investment Climate Conditions by Firms 
 
We start our analysis by examining differences in the reported business environment 
conditions across firms for the different investment climate (IC) variables defined in Section 
3 and summarized in Table 2. To do so, we estimate the following specification:  
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To capture differences in the objective conditions facing firms of different sizes we 
include size dummies (micro-enterprises is the omitted category), with the size measured by 
number of employees at the time of the survey (period t).  We also control for whether the 
firm is foreign or government owned, whether it is an exporter, whether it is located in a 
large city (or capital) or not (large city is the omitted), as well as age categories (young is the 
excluded category), all measured at period t.   
We also include variables Expandict-1 and Contractict-1 , the rate of employment 
expansion or contraction in firm i, country c, between period t-1 and period t-3.  The omitted 
category is that employment remained unchanged in the last period.  The measures of 
contraction and expansion are thus lagged one period, to have them pre-determined, but the 
claims here are not causal.  We are simply interested in describing the patterns across firms, 
examining whether there are differences in the reported objective characteristics across 
expanding and contracting firms.  These coefficients will also provide information on 
whether endogeneity is likely to be an issue in the employment regressions.  
Our focus is on within-country variations rather than across countries, therefore we 
include a full set of sector-survey interaction dummies ( j   * S   ). This allows us to control   13
not only for potential omitted variables at the country level but also for some possible 
measurement errors or differences in survey implementation across countries and sectors.   
Table 3 reports the results of estimating this specification for the nine IC variables.  
The results show that there are significant differences across firms in most of the variables in 
each of the four areas of the investment climate (access to capital, business regulations, 
corruption and infrastructure.)   Again, the focus is on differences across firms of different 
size. Regarding access to finance, our estimates indicate that controlling for firm 
characteristics and sector-survey interaction dummies, access to finance, measured as share 
of investment or working capital financed externally, grows monotonically with firm size, 
while the share of sales on credit picks for medium-size firms. Overall, large firms have 
more access to finance than medium, small and micro enterprises.  
Regarding business regulations, micro firms report a lower share of management 
time devoted to dealing with government regulations, than small, medium and large firms. 
The pattern again is increasing in firm size, although in this case medium firms spend more 
time dealing with regulations than large firms.  Days of inspections also increases 
monotonically with size with large firms spending more than triple the time dealing with 
inspections than small firms.     
Regarding corruption, the incidence of bribes is the highest among small firms. In 
addition, medium and large firms pay less in bribes –as percentage of sales-- than small or 
micro firms.  This can reflect fixed payments being relatively larger for small firms, or that 
they have less recourse to avoid making payments.  The payments may also be correlated 
with the degree of compliance with regulations; micro and small firms may not meet all of 
the requirements and have to pay officials to maintain this position. 
For infrastructure, the frequency of power outages hits small and medium firms 
hardest and large firms the least. Larger firms are more likely to have alternative sources of 
electricity (given the substantial fixed costs of owning and operating a generator).  It is also 
possible that larger firms have a greater choice among possible locations and thus chose to 
operate in areas with more reliable electricity, a hypothesis that is tested for below. 
Similarly, losses in transit are largest among small and medium size firms.  
The specifications reported on Table 3 provide some other important results.  
Perhaps the most important one is that there are indications that reported business climate   14
conditions are related to firm performance. For example, firms that expanded or contracted 
in the period previous to the survey report a higher dependency on external funds and more 
management time dealing with officials relative to firms that were stable in size. On their 
part, contracting firms spend more time in inspections than expanding or stable firms.  
Similarly, the incidence of corruption (whether a firm pays bribes) appears to be more 
severe for firms that are expanding or contracting relative to stable firms.  It appears 
corruption and dealing with authorities are the price to pay to either get ahead or preserve 
the firm in bad times. Finally, firms that are growing or contracting report more blackouts 
and more losses in transit than firms that are stable in size. While it may be that objective 
conditions vary across stable firms and the rest, it is also likely that power outages and 
transit losses are more distortive for growing or contracting firms, and therefore, they recall 
more such events and report higher values in those questions than firms that are stable.  
The former regressions suggest that objective business conditions vary 
systematically across firms of different size and economic performance.  Yet, none of these 
claims should be interpreted as causal, as one could also expect causality to run in the 
opposite direction, that is, the constraints firms face determine their size and their 
performance. However they do caution of a possible endogeneity of reported investment 
climate conditions relative to firm performance.  We address this topic in the next section of 
the paper.  
 
5. Methodology to Estimate the Impact of Investment Climate Conditions on Firm 
Employment Growth 
 
We estimate the effect of investment climate (IC) conditions on employment growth by 
means of the following specification:   
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where Empgict,t-s refers to the growth of permanent employment of firm i in country c 
between period t and t-s (generally three years before, but in a few cases, where information 
for period t-3 is not available, at periods t-1 or t-2). Differences in the period of definition of 
employment growth are identified and controlled for by the dummies EG(s)i  which take the 
value of 1 if employment growth is computed between periods t and t-s and zero otherwise. 
Investment climate conditions faced by firm i, in country c are measured along four 
dimensions (k): finance, regulations, corruption and infrastructure and are denoted by ikc IC .  
While most previous studies focus on the effect of one aspect of the investment climate, our 
concern is that omitted variables may bias results. After all, environments characterized by 
ineffective business regulations, or high incidence of corruption are also often characterized 
by poor infrastructure or low access to finance. To overcome some of these concerns, we 
control for different indicators of business climate conditions and their interactions with firm 
size simultaneously.  Size dummies are defined in four groups: micro, small, medium and 
large measured at the initial period of observation. The omitted category is micro enterprises 
employing between 1 and 10 employees. Age of the firm is specified in three categories: 
young, from 1 to 5 years old, mature, between 5 and 15 years old and older, above 15 years 
old and also refers to the initial period of observation. The other firm characteristics are 
dated at period t, the only period for which such information is available. We also control 
for ownership (foreign, government), exporting status (exporter), and location, with 
variables defined as reported in section 3.    
To account for differences in demand conditions and productive structure, the 
regressions also include a full set of sector-country interaction dummies.
14 Thus, our focus is 
on within-country rather than across country variation.  This decision reflects several 
factors.  First, there is substantial variation of investment climate indicators within countries 
and we want to test if its impact is significant.  Second, it controls for potential omitted 
variables at the country level.  In addition, it could control for some possible measurement 
errors or differences in implementation across countries.  As Haltiwanger and Schweiger 
(2005) note, in the ES there are some countries with particularly high net employment 
growth rates.  However, there is a strong country-specific component, such that country 
effects yield relative magnitudes of job creation and employment growth. They also noted 
                                                 
14  See Table A2 for the list of sectors included.   16
that the relationships of employment variations between size and age classes appear right. 
Thus, small and younger firms have higher job creation and destruction than older and larger 
firms within the country, when considering total employment.  Therefore, statistical methods 
that remove country level effects are appropriate to draw conclusions within countries on the 
difference of the impact of investment climate on different types of firms.  
The construction of the investment climate variables ikc IC  requires some explanation.  
A number of previous studies assess the investment climate experienced by firm i, using 
firm level subjective measures. Such studies rely on answers to questions of the form “how 
much (the dimension k of the business climate) is an obstacle for the growth of your firm?” 
with possible answers ranking between 1 and 5 (Ayyagari et al. 2008; Beck et al. 2005; 
Pierre and Scarpetta 2006; Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff 2002). Subjective assessments, 
while insightful, have a number of possible drawbacks.  There is a concern that firms’ 
perceptions of the business environment reflect idiosyncratic differences in the degree of 
optimism or pessimism of the individuals responding to the survey.  Answers are also likely 
to be strongly influenced by the experience and performance of the firm (see Hallward-
Driemeier and Aterido 2007). 
Our analysis uses objective measures to gauge the relative importance of the 
investment climate to firms. While, in principle, objective measures may be less likely to be 
influenced by firms’ performance than subjective measures, the results presented in Table 3 
suggest that individual firms´ reported objective investment climate conditions are likely to 
be endogenous to firm performance, a feature that we need to take into account when 
estimating the effect of investment climate variables on firm performance. 
To account for endogeneity, we construct a measure of the IC conditions faced by 
firm i on dimension k in country c, by averaging the responses of firms in the same country-
location-sector-size cell, excluding the observation from firm i in computing that average.
15 
To ensure adequate numbers of firms in each location-sector-size cell average, we drop one 
                                                 
15 In some specifications we also assess whether results vary if we instead compute IC conditions by averaging 
the responses of firms in the same country-location-sector bins (i.e. excluding size as a dimension). Here we 
use a finer disaggregation of location.  Above, locations are aggregated by city-size (e.g. capital cities and 
those with a population above one million, and cities below 1 million people).  In the country-location-sector 
averages, we construct the cells based on the actual cities or towns the firms are located in.  If the 
representation is low, locations are aggregated based on 5 size groups (capital cities or more than 1 million; 
500,000-1 million; 250,000-500,000; 50,000-250,000; less than 50,000).     17
dimension of the cell until an adequate number is reached (i.e. first we substitute country-
location-size bins, then country-sector-size)
16.  
This captures the broader environment in which the firm operates and allows the 
individual firm’s own contribution to the average to be excluded.  The approach also has the 
benefit of not losing those observations where a firm did not answer all the individual 
investment climate questions.
17   
In constructing these measures, we actually take two steps before entering the 
averages into the regressions, with the second one being particularly important if 
endogeneity concerns are to be addressed.  An issue is how the investment climate indicators 
are calculated and matched to firms in the regression.  This requires differentiating between 
a firm’s current size – that can be important in the conditions they report facing now – and 
their initial size – and the average conditions faced by firms of the size they were initially.  
Simply giving firms the average value of firms in their current size category is giving them 
the ex post conditions not the initial conditions.  To justify this, one has to assume that the 
conditions faced by firms have remained constant over time, regardless of how they may 
have grown.  The alternative we present assumes instead that conditions faced by firms are 
likely to vary as they grow.  Rather, we make the less restrictive assumption that, within a 
location and sector, conditions facing firms of a certain size now are the same as the 
conditions facing the same sized firm in the earlier period.  For example, we can use the 
information on conditions facing micro firms now to measure what micro firms faced three 
years before. 
Thus, in the first step, we use the information that firms report about investment 
climate conditions they face in the current period.  While it would be desirable to have the 
conditions they faced in the initial period three years ago, this information was not collected.   
However, we also recognize that firms that have recently changed size may report very 
                                                 
16 If we were to keep always the original 4 dimensions same country-location-sector-size cell there are 
approximate 5,000 observations that are lost and results do not change substantially.  We also used different 
minimum cell-size requirements (4-10 firms) and found results were robust.  Results presented use the cutoff 
of at least 4 firms in a cell. 
17 This approach is very similar to using location-sector-size dummies as instruments (except that the firm’s 
own value is not excluded in this calculation, the number of observations averaged in a cell may be very small, 
and the additional observations cannot be recovered if a single investment climate variable is not available.).  
The test of over-identifying restrictions could not be estimated using the full specification due to the large 
number of dummies and instruments.  However, in specifications not using a full set of sector-survey 
interaction dummies, the restrictions could not be rejected at the 0.3 level.   18
different IC conditions relative to what is typical for firms that have  been in a given size 
category for a while.  To account for this we use a firm’s average size in constructing the 
location-sector-size_averages of investment climate conditions.  We do so by constructing 
averages of investment climate indicators within cells, which are defined according to firms’ 
average size.
18 In the second step, we match these averaged indicators to firms – based on 
their initial, not current, size.
19   
This procedure has a number of advantages. The first is that as advanced in the 
former paragraph,  IC averages based on firms’ average size allows obtaining a more 
accurate measure of the IC conditions facing a firm in a given size category. Thus, if for 
example, firms that have recently expanded report lower access to capital than firms that 
have been large for a while, then accounting for the observations of growing firms in the 
construction of the IC may underestimate the average access to capital of large firms. A 
similar effect may happen for firms that have recently contracted, and report access to 
capital or other IC, which are more representative of firms that are large than of firms that 
are small. Considering firms based on their average size ameliorates this problem.  
Second, constructing a measure of IC conditions based on the initial instead of the 
current size is a key feature to minimize endogeneity problems. Thus, if we consider again 
the example of a firm that expands from being small in period t-3 to medium in t, it matters 
whether the firm is assigned the average IC conditions of small or medium firms.  The main 
point is that matching based on current size reintroduces endogeneity as firms that grow are 
assigned higher access to credit, just because they have grown, which creates a positive 
correlation between the error term and the IC conditions.  Our procedure, assumes that the 
conditions that matter for employment growth are those prevalent in the past, and that 
objective conditions remain constant over time for size classes of firms, not for individual 
firms themselves. These hypotheses allow us  constructing measures which are exogenous to 
                                                 
18 We repeated the exercise using current size in defining the cells for calculating the IC variables and did not 
find significant differences. For firms that remain in the same size category there is no difference between the 
two approaches.   
19 An example may be useful to clarify our procedure.  Let us consider, for example, a textile producing firm in 
the capital city of Chile, which was small in period t-3, has grown to be of medium size in period t and the 
average size in the two periods is medium. We use its responses on the investment climate indicators to 
construct the average of Santiago-textile-medium size firms.  However, this average is not what is then used for 
that firm in the regressions.  Since we want to capture the average IC conditions of that firm in period t-3, 
when it was small, we match it to the average reported IC investment climate conditions of Santiago-textile-
small firms.   19
the firm and control for the fact that firms may choose to grow/or not grow to face a 
determined set of IC.  We show in our estimates the importance of how the IC variables are 
constructed for the results.   
While we believe our constructed IC variables to go a long way towards addressing 
endogeneity, a lingering concern is that our results may be capturing the effects of shocks 
that are correlated across firms, which drive our constructed average IC and individual firm 
performance.  We reduce any possible biases brought by these correlations, by introducing  
as an additional regressor the average employment growth of the cell used to compute the IC 
conditions of firm i (excluding as usual, the employment growth of firm i in that 




We now describe the results attained with our estimation procedure, and presented in Table 
4, column (1). The results indicate important non-linearities in the effects of business 
environment constraints across firm size. They also suggest that a weak business 
environment tends to hurt the growth of small, medium and large firms, and benefit in 
relative terms –and for some variables, even in absolute terms—the growth of micro firms.  
As addressing endogeneity is one of our chief concerns, columns (2) – (5) demonstrate the 
significance of alternative means of addressing it – or of failing to do so. 
For all specifications, coefficients on firm characteristics (other than size), the set of 
sector-survey interaction dummies and the constant are not reported due to space constraints.  
As expected, the coefficients on firm size’s categories indicate that employment growth 
declines monotonically with firm size.
20  We focus next on the coefficients on the 
investment climate and their interactions with firm size. 
 
6.1. Access to Finance  
                                                 
20 There is a debate in the literature whether it is appropriate to use initial size or average size in firm growth 
regressions (see Teal 1999; Bigsten and Soderbom 2006).  Proponents of Gibrat’s Law favor the latter, 
although even using average size can still lead to the result that smaller firms grow faster than larger firms.  We 
repeated our regressions defining the size controls and the investment climate interactions based on  average 
size and found  very robust results.  (Note, to keep from reintroducing endogeneity, what one must avoid is 
using a measure of size from a time period prior to the one used in matching the investment climate averages to 
firms.)     20
The impact of better access or lower cost of finances on firms’ growth has been 
studied by a number of authors.
21  Beck et al. (2005) argue that financial access should favor 
small firms. In their work, they find that firms’ self reported (subjective) constraints on 
access and cost to finance are associated with lower growth of small firms relative to large 
firms.  Table 3 showed that there are differences in the amounts of finance available, which 
could already explain why smaller firms are more likely to complain about finance. Here, 
we test whether, even for the same amount of financing (measured as percentage of 
investment financed externally), the impact would be different across different types of 
firms.  Notice that finance is defined such that a larger number implies better access to 
finance. The results show strong non-linearities across firm size, and unlike earlier results, 
we find a positive effect of increased access to finance on the employment growth of 
medium and large firms and no significant effect among micro and small enterprises.
22  
We investigate the sensitivity of these results to different ways of estimating the IC 
measures and find the results to be quite sensitive to whether and how we account for 
endogeneity.      
It is useful to compare our results in column (1) with those obtained using firms’ 
individual own responses (column 2). While the number of observations declines –since not 
all firms report information for such variables—we find that using reported individual 
measures, access to finance has a positive effect across all firms which does not differ 
substantially across firm size, suggesting, that not controlling for endogeneity may 
overestimate the effect of finance on micro and small firms.  Notice that differences in 
coefficients across columns (1) and (2) are not due to the smaller number of observations in 
column (2). Column (3) reports the results of reproducing the estimates presented in column 
(1) for the same sample as in column (2) and the results do not vary much: If anything the 
finding that finance helps medium and larger firms if endogeneity is properly controlled for 
becomes even stronger.  
In column (4), we report the results when using IC measures which are constructed 
as reported in Section 3, but with the only difference that the averages within country-city-
sector-size cells are matched to current rather than initial size. As mentioned, this is likely to 
                                                 
21 See for example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimov (1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Beck et al. (2005).  
22 The test that the overall effect of access to finance on medium and large firms is equal to zero is rejected at 
the 10 percent significance level for large firms and at the 12 percent level for medium firms.     21
re-introduce some level of endogeneity as growing firms are matched with higher levels of 
access to finance.  In this case we find that all firms benefit from access to finance, and 
while the coefficients point to smaller benefits for larger firms, differences across firm size 
are not statistically significant.    
The fact that results are fairly similar when using individual firm responses or cell 
averages matched to current size, and at the same time quite different from the results when 
measuring IC based on cell averages matched to initial size, suggests that (i) endogeneity is 
likely to bias the estimates when not accounting for it, and that (ii) using averages matched 
on current size does not solve the endogeneity problem. Quite the opposite, it reintroduces 
endogeneity in the IC measures due to the match.    
Our findings also suggest that the results found by previous studies that access to 
finance benefits mostly the smaller firms may be driven by endogeneity. In our sample, 
there are as many as 16% of the firms that start up as micro and transit to larger firms. 
Depending on the procedure, such firms either report higher access to capital for 
endogeneous reasons (i.e. because they have grown), or are matched with higher access to 
capital than the average of initially small firms (i.e. are given the average access to capital of 
larger firms). This creates a positive bias in the coefficient for micro and small firms. 
Conversely about 7 % of large firms shrink and become smaller firms in our sample. As they 
become smaller, they are likely to report lower access to finance or, depending on the 
method, be matched to the access to capital of smaller firms. This creates a downward bias 
in the coefficient of larger firms.  
Column (5) presents the results of further assessing the robustness of our main 
results when constructing the IC averages with country-sector-location averages. Results 
confirm the findings presented in our basic specification (column 1): increased access to 
external finance to fund investments seems to benefits mostly medium-size and larger firms.  
Why would micro or small firms not be positively affected by increased access to 
finance? Jeong and Townsend (2007) show that with a wide range of talent among micro-
entrepreneurs, access to finance may not be the binding constraint they face in growing their 
firms. If access to finance is restricted, individuals with high entrepreneurial talent but low 
wealth are size constrained, and the demand for wage employment is low, which drives 
many individuals to become entrepreneurs even when they do not have much   22
entrepreneurial talent.  Increased access to finance sorts the good from the less talented 
entrepreneurs. Those who are good can grow their firms; those who have lower 
entrepreneurial talent suffer as wages increase due to an increase demand for labor.  Our 
estimates, particularly the negative, albeit not statistically significant coefficient on micro 
firms, may then reflect this selection effect.  
 
6.2. Regulatory Environment 
Measures of the regulatory environment show that business regulations measured as 
the share of time that management devotes to dealing with government regulations have 
differential effects across firm size. Our results suggest that regulations create growth 
bottlenecks for small firms, which may fear/avoid expansion to limit their exposure to red 
tape and increased enforcement.  Testing the overall significance by size confirms that the 
overall effect of regulations on employment growth for small firms  (the sum of the 
coefficient on micro and small firms) is significantly different from zero while those for 
medium and large firm are not. Thus, business regulations do not appear to affect the growth 
of larger firms.  On the other hand, the positive effect for micro firms suggests that micro 
firms benefit from a generally lower enforcement stand for micro firms, which may help 
divert some economic activity to micro firms.  
Results are quite similar across all specifications regardless of how the IC variables 
are computed, suggesting that endogeneity may be a less important concern in this case.    
 
6.3. Corruption  
Moving on to results for corruption, we find that as in the case of access to finance, 
results vary substantially whether and how we account for endogeneity.  Results based on 
individual responses (column 2) or cell averages matched to current  size (column 4) would 
suggest that corruption helps micro firms, while having a much smaller, and in some cases 
negative effect on the growth of larger firms.  Measuring the incidence of corruption based 
on country-industry-location size averages matched to initial size or on country-industry 
locations, in our opinion, two better ways of accounting for endogeneity, yields results that 
go in the same direction but are not statistically significant. This suggests that while 
corruption may have differential effects across firm size, and possibly adverse effects on   23
medium size firms, the presence of endogeneity creates biases that increase the probability 
of finding this result. 
 
 6.4. Infrastructure 
With regards to infrastructure bottlenecks, measured as the incidence of power 
outages, results are again quite sensitive to whether we control or not for endogeneity. Using 
our baseline specification (column 1), we find evidence that infrastructure bottlenecks tend 
to stunt the growth of medium and large firms.  Instead, the coefficient for micro firms is 
positive, indicating that again, micro firms may benefit from the troubles of larger, possibly 
more productive firms as some production may be diverted to micro firms.  The coefficient 
on micro firms however is not statistically significant.  But the difference between micro and 
small/medium firms is larger taking into account that small and medium firms report more 
frequent outages than micro firms.  This is consistent with micro firms using less capital and 
energy intensive modes of production and benefiting that these processes can be sustained 
due to hardships hitting the SMEs. 
Results appear stronger when individual firms’ responses are used to compute IC but 
the coefficients are of similar magnitudes than those reported in column (1). This suggests 
that endogeneity does not appear as a large concern and that results in column (3) are 
estimated with more precision as IC vary at the firm level. Computing IC out of the average 
within country- location-sector cells also yields similar but stronger results than in column 
(1). All in all, the results suggest that poor infrastructure has a detrimental effect on the 
growth of all firms but the micro ones. 
 
7. Robustness  
 
We now examine whether our results are robust to changes in the definition of variables, set 
of controls, and sample of countries.  
 
7.1. Addressing Other Possible Sources of Endogeneity 
Another source of potential endogeneity is whether better performing firms choose 
locations based on the quality of the business environment.  To see if this could be   24
significant, column (1) reports the results if we restrict the sample to domestic-owned, micro 
and SME’s who are least likely to be footloose and where the location tends to be associated 
with the places of birth or residence of the business owner.  Foreign firms and large 
domestic firms are the most likely to be selective in their choice of location.  The results are 
very robust.   
 
7.2. Alternative Definitions of Investment Climate Indicators 
The second set of robustness checks involves using alternative measures of the 
different investment climate areas.  The surveys generally provide various measures to 
choose from.  Of particular interest are measures on access to finance.   There are two sets of 
results, that the nature of the finance being captured matters, and, that the results are 
somewhat sensitive to whether variation across sectors within a country is included or not.  
To examine the different types of finance, two additional measures are included – the 
share of sales made on credit and access to working capital from external institutions.  The 
measures used so far captures a type of finance that is relatively more difficult to access, 
namely financing for longer term investment projects from formal financial institutions. The 
other two alternatives presented in Table 5 measure access to a more informal form of 
financing and to shorter term financing from institutions.  In the case of the share of sales on 
credit, the results show that micro firms do not share in the benefits of access to this 
financing, consistent with such credit being offered less by micro firms. Small and medium 
sized firms do benefit.  The impact on large firms is not significant, which again is not so 
surprising as this type of finance is relatively less important for them.  For access to working 
capital, column (3) the benefits are more widespread.  If anything, this type of financing is 
most beneficial for the micro firms, although the differences across sizes are not significant. 
The second point is that these results are sensitive to whether one allows for sectoral 
variation within countries to be included.  Our results so far have included the full set of 
interacted sector-survey dummies.  However, here (Table 5, columns 2-4) the results are 
more significant when sector and country dummies enter separately.  There are two 
interpretations that can be given to this finding.  First, the original rationale to include the 
broader set of dummies was in part to control for demand shocks that could vary by country 
and sector.  Failing to control for sector-country shocks, endogeneity could be re-entering   25
the regressions.  Such shocks could affect firm performance and increase their demand for 
financing.  This would imply caution in interpreting the results.  However, there is a second 
interpretation. Work by Rajan and Zingales points to potentially important differences 
across sectors in the impact of improved access to finance for growth.  Beck et al. 2008 
show that sectors with a larger proportion of small firms stand to benefit disproportionately 
from financial development.  Including interactions sector-survey dummies then shuts down 
this channel, explaining why these two variables, share of sales sold on credit and the share 
of working capital financed externally lose their significance when all the interactions are 
included in the regression. 
Column (4) also includes alternative measures for the other 3 investment climate 
measures.  They are days of inspections, the size of bribes paid and losses incurred during 
transportation delays.  The measure of inspections has the same effect as that of 
management time spent dealing with officials, deterring small and medium sized firms from 
growing.  However, the new measures of corruption do not offer new insights, and the use of 
the transportation related variable provides weaker results.  One conclusion is that power, 
not transportation (at least when measured as percentage of sales lost in transportation), is 
the more important dimension of infrastructure affecting firm growth. 
 
7.3. Variations in Definition of Size Categories 
Table 6 investigates whether results are robust to variations in size classifications.  
For comparison purposes, column (1) reproduces the results of Table 4, column (1).  
Column (2), Table 6 reports the results of defining micro firms as firms with 5 to 10 
employees, and excluding from the estimation firms with less than 5 employees. The other 
size categories remain unchanged.   The results on access to finance weaken for medium 
sized firms, suggesting that the differential effects of finance between micro and medium 
size firms are in part explained by the more negative effect of finance on the smallest firms. 
This lends additional support to the selection story proposed by Jeong and Townsend, 2007, 
as the very small firms are the ones that are likely to be less productive, and therefore, more 
likely to be hurt by increasing costs of inputs driven by a higher supply of credit.   
In column (3) we follow the size category cutoffs used by Beck et al (2005), which 
implies combining most of our micro with all our small into one category and combining our   26
medium with many of our large into the medium category and leaving only the very largest 
in the large category.  With these cutoffs, and controlling for endogeneity, we do not 
replicate their finding that the smallest firms benefit the most (although their result is 
reproduced if we match conditions based on current rather than initial size).  The results also 
show that it is not the very largest firms that benefit from finance relative to the small, but 
rather those in the mid size (50-500 employees) range. 
The results on regulations show that the positive relationship is driven by the 
smallest firms, excluding those with less than 5 employees leaves the effect insignificant for 
the remaining micro firms.  Still, the effect remains negative for the small firms.  In column 
(3), when all the micro are excluded, the omitted category is now small and the effect is 
negative but not significant.   Medium and large firms still have a more positive response to 
regulations than the small.  However, combining the firms into the larger size categories 
misses the entire story, with no results appearing significant. 
For corruption, however, the story does become stronger once the micro firms are 
dropped (column 3) or absorbed with small firms (column 2).  Now there is a positive and 
significant effect for the smaller firms that is offset for the larger firms, significantly so for 
the very large firms. Combined with the regulation results, small firms above the 10 
employee threshold, i.e. those that are large enough to find evasion from regulations more 
difficult, find measures of regulation more detrimental to their growth—but that corruption 
offers a way of mitigating these effects.  For medium firms, regulations are not so 
detrimental as for small firms (in fact they have a small net positive effect) – and corruption 
is correspondingly less beneficial for medium firms. 
 
7.4. Age versus Size  
It is well known that size is strongly correlated with age, as firms tend to start 
operations small and grow overtime. We assess whether differences in the impact of 
business environment variables could be related to age rather than size by adding a full set 
of interactions of age dummies with IC variables to our baseline results (Table 4, column 1).  
Results for size*IC interactions remain very similar however, some interesting results 
emerge from the size interactions (see Table 7). We find that regulations tend to affect the 
growth of older, more established firms, relative to younger ones. Combined with the size   27
interactions, these results provide some interesting qualifications to our baseline results. 
They suggest that the adverse effect of regulations on the growth of small firms is more 
visible among firms that are small, but have been in business for a while, rather than for 
firms that are small and young. Similarly, these results allow qualifying the statement that 
micro firms benefit from a poor regulatory environment.  In fact, the firms that have been 
around for a while are the ones that benefit from regulations, while micro-young ones do 
not. It may well be that a poor regulatory environment increases the survival of low 
productivity firms (i.e. firms that do not have the entrepreneurial ability to grow) because it 
penalizes more severely, higher productivity firms.  
Another interesting result of the size interactions is that corruption seems to 
disproportionally benefit older, more established firms. Perhaps, age is correlated with the 
access to networks and influence channels. We may also be capturing that a corrupt 
environment makes the survival of certain types of firms more likely, which then are 
observed as older at the time of the survey. Addressing this form of sample selection is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
7.5. Different Samples   
The results so far have pooled countries together (with sector-survey fixed effects), 
but it could be that the effects vary by country groupings, along dimensions that can 
reinforce or weaken the broader business environment.  To test whether the institutional 
development of countries matter, we divide the sample according to the depth of credit 
markets (Table 8, columns 1-2), the degree by which countries control corruption (columns 
3-4) and the strength of their rule of law (columns 5-6).
23 Quite interestingly, results for 
increased access to finance turn out to be much stronger in countries with a more developed 
financial system, suggesting again that a marginal development in a country’s financial 
system tends to favor small, medium  and to a lower extent large size firms, rather than 
micro firms. This also suggests that finance operates better in economies with more 
developed financial markets. This result is further confirmed by the results in columns (3) – 
                                                 
23  We also looked whether there were significant patterns by income or GDP per capital.  As the differences 
were less pronounced than those that capture the institutional environment, we do not report them.  We do 
note, however, that this implies that it is indeed the broader institutional environment that does matter rather 
than income itself.   28
(4), which show that the effect of increased access to finance is stronger in economies with 
higher control of corruption and better rule of law all hallmarks of better functioning 
economies.   
Business regulations, measured as the percentage of management time spent dealing 
with regulations, have a negative effect on the growth of small firms throughout most 
samples of countries, suggesting that the conclusion that stringent regulations may lead 
many small firms to grow less in order to hide from the authorities is quite robust to the 
inclusion or exclusion of countries.  What is striking is that results are stronger in countries 
with either lower control of corruption or a weaker rule of law.  It may be that the quality of 
the regulations in lower institutional environments are more burdensome, resulting in the 
greater constraints on small firms.  It is also possible that more onerous regulations in a 
weak institutional setting opens the way to corruption or harassment on the part of officials 
encouraging firms to remain small and below the radar screen where possible.   
The direct effects of corruption on the growth of firms tend to be more significant in 
countries with higher control of corruption.  Corruption, in a setting where corruption is not 
controlled, does not have much of an effect.  However, if, in a stronger institutional 
environment, there is still corruption, it provides incentives to keep operations small. The 
effects of corruption on larger firms are significantly negative in countries with better 
control of corruption.  It thus appears that the distortions generated by corruption are more 
important and distort firm growth more in countries where markets and institutions are more 
developed and a higher share of resources is allocated via markets.   
Finally, infrastructure bottlenecks appear as a constraint to the growth of small, 
medium and /or large firm in most samples of countries although the levels of significance 
vary across samples, with the stronger effects for medium-sized firm.    
 
All in all, the results above suggest that improving on some domains of the 
investment climate constraints may be more important to the extent that other aspects of the 
business climate and institutional development improve. Thus, financial market 
development brings higher development to medium and large firms in regions where there is 
higher control of corruption and a better rule of law. Similarly, improving business 
regulations may be more important where institutional development otherwise lags.    29
Cracking down on corruption is still an issue even in more developed institutional countries, 




This paper has provided new evidence of the role of the investment climate in employment 
growth. The results indicate significant differences across size categories of firms—both in 
terms of differences in objective conditions faced by firms and in terms of non-linearities in 
the impact of these conditions.  The paper also devotes substantial effort to surmount 
endogeneity concerns between investment climate measures and business performance and 
finds that accounting for endogeneity reduces the differential effects of business climate on 
the performance of different types of firms. Yet, the results indicate that a poor business 
climate tends to hurt the growth of small, medium and large firms, and benefit in relative—
but in cases also in absolute cases, micro firms.  
It also finds that increased access to finance, particularly external finance to fund 
investment, has a larger positive effect in the growth of small, medium and large firms, 
particularly in economies with more developed financial systems or better rule of law.  
Thus, unlike previous literature, this paper does not find that the impact on employment 
growth of an extra unit of external finance is highest for micro firms. We interpret these 
results as evidence that micro firms are not necessarily more credit constrained. Instead, 
many micro entrepreneurs may have little willingness or capabilities to grow their firms. As 
access to finance increases, micro firms may endure input price increases and production 
displacement caused by the growth of large, more productive firms that attain higher 
benefits of increased access to finance. The results also reinforce the importance of 
differentiating the impact across size classes of firms and allowing micro firms (less than 10 
employees) to be different from “small” firms.   
Another important finding of this paper is that business regulations measured as a 
higher share of management time spent dealing with regulations or inspections, may stunt 
the growth of small firms. Thus, as management time dealing with authorities as well as 
inspections increase substantially with firm size, the marginal increase in enforcement can 
act as a strong disincentive to grow a firm.    30
What are the aggregate implications of these findings for the size, efficiency and 
dynamism of the business sector in developing countries? The results found in this paper 
suggest that a weak business environment displaces activity from large, medium and small 
firms in benefit of micro ones. To the extent that larger firms are more productive—as 
suggested by many theoretical models of firm dynamics—this would imply substantial 
resource reallocation from more productive to less productive ones, potentially leading to 
important losses in aggregate productivity.   In addition, given that enforcement of taxes and 
regulations tends to be smaller in micro firms, a shift of economic activity towards these 
firms is likely to imply that a larger share of firms remain informal or semi-informal, 
reducing the capacity of the state of collecting taxes and paying for fundamental inputs for 
development such as education. Finally, if there are substantial fixed costs in activities like 
innovation or worker training, a higher share of activity in micro firms may imply more 
firms and workers locked in activities with limited innovation and growth opportunities.   31
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Table 1: Employment Growth 
             
Initial size,t-3  Mean  p25  Median  p75 
size 1-10  0.220  0.000  0.000  0.444 
size 11-50  0.081  0.000  0.000  0.261 
size 51-200  0.033  -0.087  0.000  0.200 
size +200  -0.022  -0.115  0.000  0.122 







Table 2: Variable Description 
           
Variable   Description  mean sd 
Emp-gr Employment  growth    0.117  0.411 
Labor,t  Number of employees in period t (log)  3.112  1.618 
Sh-invest-fin  Share of investments financed externally  0.209  0.347 
Sh-work-cap-fin  Share of working capital financed externally  0.201  0.137 
Sh-sales-cr  Percentage of sales sold on credit  0.424  0.396 
Mng-time  % of management's time dealing with regulations  8.872  15.104
Days-inspections  Total days spent on inspections  during last year   15.990  31.721
Bribe y-n  Bribes given to get things done (yes-no)  0.425  0.494 
Bribe (%)  Amount of bribe paid to get things done  1.507  4.242 
Days-no power  Number of power outages experienced during the last year   38.143  83.993
Loss_transit (%)  Percentage of the average cargo's value lost while in transit  1.547  5.736                            Table 3: Investment Climate by Firm's Characteristics   
   Dependent variable: Investment climate variable    























Small 0.049***  0.045***  0.072***  1.239***  0.238***  0.029***  0.054  0.061***  0.143* 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.152) (0.014) (0.006) (0.051)  (0.015)  (0.074) 
Medium 0.093***  0.087***  0.096***  1.767***  0.508***  0.014*  -0.250***  0.050***  0.202** 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.199) (0.017) (0.008) (0.060)  (0.018)  (0.086) 
Large 0.119***  0.117***  0.090***  1.468***  0.715***  0.001  -0.361***  -0.088***  0.039 
  (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.234) (0.022) (0.010) (0.067)  (0.022)  (0.099) 
Mature 0.013***  0.006*  0.009**  0.278*  0.038**  -0.004  -0.114*  0.063***  -0.192** 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.150) (0.015) (0.007) (0.058)  (0.016)  (0.083) 
Older 0.010**  0.011***  0.006  0.494***  0.059***  -0.020**  -0.236***  0.072***  -0.204** 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.180) (0.017) (0.008) (0.065)  (0.018)  (0.089) 
Exporter 0.030***  0.037***  0.048***  0.504***  0.085***  0.040***  -0.057  0.058***  0.217*** 
  (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.159) (0.014) (0.007) (0.050)  (0.015)  (0.067) 
Foreign -0.041***  -0.025***  0.043***  0.094  0.061*** -0.016**  -0.080  -0.038** -0.213** 
  (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.183) (0.018) (0.008) (0.064)  (0.018)  (0.088) 
Smallcity 0.010***  0.009***  -0.014***  -0.190 0.025*  -0.053***  -0.228***  0.118***  -0.072 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.144) (0.013) (0.006) (0.043)  (0.013)  (0.063) 
Government -0.035***  -0.013**  -0.041***  0.599** 0.000 -0.132***  -0.496***  -0.112***  -0.078 
  (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.242) (0.026) (0.010) (0.064)  (0.025)  (0.125) 
Expand 0.041***  0.029***  0.029***  0.491**  0.018  0.053***  0.142**  0.098***  0.243** 
  (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.209) (0.019) (0.008) (0.069)  (0.020)  (0.098) 
Contract 0.027***  0.040***  0.044***  1.771***  0.140***  0.088***  0.523***  0.059**  0.435** 
  (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.308) (0.027) (0.012) (0.105)  (0.028)  (0.169) 
Survey*Sector  f.e.  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.133***  0.124***  0.359***  7.477***  1.516***    1.812***  1.570***  1.465*** 
  (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.184) (0.018)  (0.066)  (0.018)  (0.097) 
Observations 42519  63020  65531  63295  56794  51707  50610  61309  45272 
R-squared  0.19 0.21 0.31 0.18 0.31 0.17 0.10 0.53 0.07 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Robust standard errors in parentheses.   
Firm characteristics are at time t.               
col(6) is a dprobit, so coefficients are marginal effects and R-squared is Pseudo R-squared.       Table 4: Impact of Investment Climate on Employment Growth 
Dependent Variable: Employment Growth (Emp(t)-Emp(t-3))/((Emp(t)+Emp(t-3))/2) 









ICvar as in 











Sh_invest_fin  -0.055 0.083*** -0.095 0.583*** -0.008 
  (0.059) (0.018) (0.074) (0.075) (0.033) 
(Small)*Sh_invest_fin 0.092 -0.022 0.090 0.039 0.047 
  (0.065) (0.023) (0.077) (0.070) (0.040) 
(Medium)*Sh_invest_fin 0.130*  -0.028 0.159* -0.024  0.115** 
  (0.075) (0.024) (0.086) (0.083) (0.045) 
(Large)*Sh_invest_fin 0.136* -0.019 0.221*** -0.134 0.110** 
  (0.071) (0.028) (0.085) (0.087) (0.056) 
Sh_mng_time 0.003**  0.001***  0.005***  0.011***  0.002*** 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
(Small)*Sh_mng_time  -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.008*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
(Medium)*Sh_mng_time -0.003  -0.001** -0.005**  -0.003*  -0.002** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
(Large)*Sh_mng_time -0.003*  -0.002***  -0.007***  -0.005***  -0.002** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Bribe_y_n 0.051  0.027***  0.043  0.015  0.025 
  (0.041) (0.010) (0.046) (0.045) (0.021) 
(Small)*Bribe_y_n -0.004  -0.035*** -0.023  -0.031  -0.012 
  (0.045) (0.014) (0.047) (0.048) (0.024) 
(Medium)*Bribe_y_n -0.073  -0.058***  -0.032  -0.104*  -0.041 
  (0.054) (0.016) (0.053) (0.058) (0.030) 
(Large)*Bribe_y_n -0.056  -0.026  -0.025  -0.099*  -0.029 
  (0.051) (0.017) (0.055) (0.058) (0.033) 
Days-no power  0.008  0.009***  0.016  0.002  0.006 
  (0.008) (0.003) (0.010) (0.009) (0.004) 
(Small)*Days-no power  -0.006  -0.008*  -0.011  -0.007  -0.008** 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) 
(Medium)*Days-no power  -0.014*  -0.010**  -0.021**  -0.024***  -0.015*** 
  (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) 
(Large)*Days-no power  -0.015*  -0.010**  -0.020**  -0.019**  -0.014** 
  (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) 
(Small)  -0.110***  -0.108*** -0.071** -0.136***  -0.103*** 
  (0.028) (0.013) (0.028) (0.031) (0.017) 
(Medium)  -0.149*** -0.162*** -0.151*** -0.143*** -0.162*** 
  (0.032) (0.017) (0.032) (0.035) (0.021) 
(Large)  -0.210*** -0.239*** -0.217*** -0.181*** -0.224*** 
  (0.031) (0.019) (0.034) (0.037) (0.023) 
Firm Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey*Sector f.e.  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  56880 28619 28616 56880 55612 
R-squared  0.15 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.15 
Significant at * 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%; s.e. are clustered on survey-location-sector-size.   
Firm Controls: dummies for firm age (t-3), foreign or government owned, exporter status, if in small city,  
empg base yrs, avg. employment growth in cell, and a constant term. Size is t-3. (Definitions in Section 3). 
cols. (1) & (3) cells based on survey-sector-location-avg_size (excluding own); col. (4) uses current size.   37
Table 5: Robustness 
Dependent Variable: Employment Growth (Emp(t)-Emp(t-3))/((Emp(t)+Emp(t-3))/2) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Control for possible 
location selection 
bias 









4 alternative IC 
variables♦ 
Finance -0.046  -0.039  0.194**  0.272*** 
 (0.061)  (0.033)  (0.083)  (0.089) 
(Small)*Finance 0.093  0.092***  -0.108  -0.245*** 
 (0.065)  (0.033)  (0.072)  (0.075) 
(Medium)*Finance 0.168** 0.066*  -0.126  -0.237*** 
 (0.079)  (0.035)  (0.085)  (0.091) 
(Large)*Finance   0.034  -0.111  -0.178* 
   (0.037)  (0.084)  (0.093) 
Regulations 0.003**  0.004***  0.004***  0.012 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.012) 
(Small)*Regulations -0.005*** -0.006***  -0.005***  -0.029*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.009) 
(Medium)*Regulations -0.001  -0.004*** -0.003*  -0.023* 
 (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.013) 
(Large)*Regulations  -0.005***  -0.003*  -0.017 
   (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.014) 
Corruption 0.047  0.007  0.033  0.004 
 (0.042)  (0.024)  (0.034)  (0.006) 
(Small)*Corruption 0.013  0.043*  -0.007  0.002 
 (0.046)  (0.025)  (0.033)  (0.005) 
(Medium)*Corruption -0.055  -0.001  -0.070  -0.003 
 (0.057)  (0.029)  (0.044)  (0.007) 
(Large)*Corruption   0.021  -0.043  -0.009 
   (0.033)  (0.043)  (0.008) 
Infrastructure 0.006  0.008  0.008  0.000 
 (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.004) 
(Small)*Infrastructure -0.003  -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
(Medium)*Infrastructure -0.012  -0.008  -0.006  0.002 
 (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.004) 
(Large)*Infrastructure   -0.007  -0.009  0.003 
   (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.005) 
Firm Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Survey*Sector f.e.  Yes  No  No  No 
Survey and Sector f.e.  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 46122  54442  54013  48411 
R-squared 0.15  0.115  0.122  0.122 
Significant at * 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%; s.e. are clustered on survey-location-sector-size. 
Firm Controls: dummies for firm size and age (t-3), foreign or government owned, exporter status, if in small city,  
empg base yrs, avg. employment growth in cell, and a constant term.       
All ICvar use cell avg, matched to initial size; cells based on survey-sector-location-avg_size (excluding own).    
Col. (1) Finance=Sh_invest_fin; Regulations=Sh_mng_time; Corruption=Bribe y-n; Infrastr.=Days_no power.     
Results in columns (2) and (3) use the same variables as column (1) with exception of Finance variable.    
Col(4) ♦IC alternative: Finance=sh_wkcap; Regul.=days-inspections;Corrup.= bribe-%; Infrastr.=losstransit.    
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Table 6: Other Size Definitions 
Dependent Variable: Employment Growth (Emp(t)-Emp(t-3))/((Emp(t)+Emp(t-3))/2) 
 Baseline    (1)  (2)  (3) 







rest of sizes as 






Sh_invest_fin  -0.055 -0.078  -0.047 -0.032 
 (0.059)  (0.069)  (0.048)  (0.046) 
(Small, t-3)*Sh_invest_fin 0.092  0.084     
 (0.065)  (0.070)     
(Medium)*Sh_invest_fin 0.130*  0.132  0.114**  0.057 
 (0.075)  (0.085)  (0.053)  (0.052) 
(Large)*Sh_invest_fin 0.136*  0.149*  0.062  0.070 
 (0.071)  (0.081)  (0.073)  (0.059) 
Sh_mng_time  0.003** 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
(Small)*Sh_mng_time -0.005***  -0.004***    
 (0.001)  (0.002)     
(Medium.t-3)*Sh_mng_time -0.003  -0.001  0.002  0.003** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
(Large)*Sh_mng_time -0.003*  -0.002  -0.000  0.002 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Bribe_y_n  0.051 0.014  0.007**  0.008** 
 (0.041)  (0.044)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
(Small)*Bribe_y_n -0.004  0.037     
 (0.045)  (0.043)     
(Medium)*Bribe_y_n -0.073  -0.026  -0.004  -0.005 
 (0.054)  (0.055)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
(Large)*Bribe_y_n -0.056  -0.005  -0.019*  -0.012 
 (0.051)  (0.053)  (0.011)  (0.008) 
Days-no power  0.008 0.002  -0.004 0.001 
 (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
(Small)*Days-no power  -0.006  -0.002     
 (0.005)  (0.006)     
(Medium)*Days-no power  -0.014*  -0.010  -0.007  -0.007 
 (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
(Large)*Days-no power  -0.015*  -0.010  0.009  -0.002 
 (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.008) 
Firm Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Survey*Sector f.e.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 56880  47491  47222  34474 
R-squared 0.15  0.13  0.12  0.12 
Significant at * 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%; s.e. are clustered on survey-location-sector-size.    
Firm Controls: dummies for firm size and age (t-3), foreign or government owned, exporter status, if in small city,  
empg base yrs, avg. employment growth in cell, and a constant term.        
All ICvar use cell avg, matched to initial size; cells based on survey-sector-location-avg_size (excluding own).     39
Table 7: Is it Size or Age that Matters? 
Dependent Variable: Employment Growth (Emp(t)-Emp(t-3))/((Emp(t)+Emp(t-3))/2) 
Investment Climate variable (ICvar)        Continuation    
Sh_invest_fin  -0.053      
 (0.064)       
(Small, t-3)*Sh_invest_fin 0.093       
 (0.065)       
(Medium)*Sh_invest_fin 0.127*    (Mature,  t-3)*Sh_invest_fin -0.004 
 (0.076)      (0.037) 
(Large)*Sh_invest_fin 0.132*    (Older)*Sh_invest_fin  0.003 
 (0.072)      (0.041) 
Sh_mng_time  0.005***      
 (0.001)       
(Small)*Sh_mng_time -0.005***       
 (0.001)      
(Medium.t-3)*Sh_mng_time -0.002    (Mature)*Sh_mng_time  -0.002*** 
 (0.002)      (0.001) 
(Large)*Sh_mng_time -0.002    (Older)*Sh_mng_time  -0.004*** 
 (0.002)      (0.001) 
Bribe_y_n  0.029      
 (0.042)      
(Small)*Bribe_y_n -0.011       
 (0.046)       
(Medium)*Bribe_y_n -0.087    (Mature)*Bribe  y_n  0.037 
 (0.056)      (0.024) 
(Large)*Bribe_y_n -0.071    (Older)*Bribe  y_n  0.058** 
 (0.053)      (0.029) 
Days-no power  0.006      
 (0.009)       
(Small)*Days-no power  -0.006    (Mature)*Days_no_power  0.003 
 (0.005)      (0.003) 
(Medium)*Days-no power  -0.015*    (Older)*Days_no_power  0.003 
 (0.008)      (0.004) 
(Large)*Days-no power  -0.015*    Mature  -0.086*** 
 (0.008)      (0.013) 
(Small) -0.110***    Older  -0.137*** 
 (0.029)      (0.016) 
(Medium) -0.148***    Firm  Controls  Yes 
 (0.032)    Survey*Sector  f.e.  Yes 
(Large) -0.209***    Observations  56880 
 (0.032)    R-squared  0.15 
Significant at * 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%; s.e. are clustered on survey-location-sector-size.    
Firm Controls: dummies for whether firm is foreign or government owned, exporter status, if in small city,  
empg base yrs, avg. employment growth in cell, and a constant term. Size and age are t-3.    
All ICvar are cell avg, matched to initial size; cells based on survey-sector-loc.-avg_size (excluding own). 
This is a single regression, reported in two columns due to the many variables included.   
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Table 8: Institutional Effects  (IC on Employment Growth) 
Dependent Variable: Employment Growth (Emp(t)-Emp(t-3))/((Emp(t)+Emp(t-3))/2) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Domestic credit to private sector  Control corruption  Rule of law 
   <=median  >median  <=0   >0   <=0  >0  
Sh_invest_fin 0.070  -0.112  0.020  -0.110  0.035  -0.158* 
 (0.094)  (0.076)  (0.079)  (0.081) (0.080)  (0.085) 
(Small)*Sh_invest_fin -0.097 0.202**  0.015  0.185*  -0.017  0.222** 
 (0.093)  (0.084)  (0.081)  (0.099) (0.079)  (0.096) 
(Medium)*Sh_invest_fin -0.019  0.203*  0.051 0.204*  0.016  0.311** 
 (0.113)  (0.116)  (0.096)  (0.113) (0.096)  (0.127) 
(Large)*Sh_invest_fin -0.026  0.145 0.026  0.096  0.005  0.197* 
 (0.115)  (0.097)  (0.093)  (0.120) (0.097)  (0.112) 
Sh_mng_time 0.001  0.006**  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
 (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003) 
(Small)*Sh_mng_time -0.002  -0.009***  -0.003**  -0.005 
-
0.004** -0.004 
 (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002)  (0.002) 
(Medium)*Sh_mng_time -0.000  -0.005 0.000  -0.002  -0.000  -0.001 
 (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003) 
(Large)*Sh_mng_time 0.001  -0.010***  0.001  -0.006*  0.001  -0.004 
 (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003) 
Bribe_y_n 0.049  0.043  0.016  0.136**  0.008  0.004 
 (0.048)  (0.064)  (0.051)  (0.065) (0.006)  (0.013) 
(Small)*Bribe_y_n -0.021  0.029  0.043  -0.118*  -0.003  0.006 
 (0.045)  (0.070)  (0.055)  (0.063) (0.006)  (0.014) 
(Medium)*Bribe_y_n -0.059 -0.072  -0.026 
-
0.252*** -0.007  0.005 
 (0.063)  (0.087)  (0.069)  (0.086) (0.008)  (0.015) 
(Large)*Bribe_y_n -0.030  -0.045  0.019 -0.178**  -0.010  -0.008 
 (0.063)  (0.076)  (0.064)  (0.078) (0.010)  (0.017) 
Days-no power  0.003  0.012  -0.000  0.024  -0.000  0.018 
 (0.010)  (0.015)  (0.010)  (0.020) (0.010)  (0.017) 
(Small)*Days-no power  -0.007  0.004  -0.000  -0.011  -0.001  -0.011 
 (0.006)  (0.012)  (0.007)  (0.018) (0.007)  (0.012) 
(Medium)*Days-no 
power -0.015*  -0.002  -0.005 -0.043*  -0.005  -0.030* 
 (0.009)  (0.015)  (0.009)  (0.022) (0.009)  (0.017) 
(Large)*Days-no power  -0.007  -0.005  0.001  -0.025  0.009  -0.024 
 (0.010)  (0.014)  (0.010)  (0.024) (0.011)  (0.017) 
Firm Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Survey*Sector f.e.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 31854  23157  41575  15205  33104  23667 
R-squared 0.16  0.11  0.16  0.12  0.17  0.12 
Significant at * 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%; s.e. are clustered on survey-location-sector-size. 
Firm Controls: dummies for firm size and age (t-3), foreign or government owned, exporter status, if small 
city, empg base yrs, avg. employment growth in cell, and a constant term.   
All ICvar are cell avg, matched to initial size; cells based on survey-sector-loc.-avg_size (excluding own). 
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Table A1: Dataset 
                          
Country  N. obs.  %  Country  N. obs.  %  Country  N. obs.  % 
Albania2002 166  0.29  Ghana2007  249  0.44  Panama2006  550  0.97 
Albania2005 202  0.35 Greece2005  539  0.95 Paraguay2006 561  0.99 
Angola2006 274  0.48  Guatemala2003  451  0.79  Peru2006  603  1.06 
Argentina2006 950  1.67  Guatemala2006 494  0.87  Philippines2003  614  1.08 
Armenia2002 170  0.3  Guinea2006  181  0.32  Poland2002  495  0.87 
Armenia2005  351 0.62  GuineaBissau2006 129 0.23  Poland2003  105 0.18 
Azerbaijan2002 162  0.28  Guyana2004  152  0.27  Poland2005  969  1.7 
Azerbaijan2005 348  0.61  Honduras2003  436  0.77  Portugal2005  501  0.88 
Bangladesh2002 964  1.69  Honduras2006  419  0.74  Romania2002  254  0.45 
Belarus2002 250  0.44  Hungary2002 245  0.43  Romania2005  586  1.03 
Belarus2005 322  0.57  Hungary2005 602  1.06  Russia2002 488  0.86 
Belarus2008 232  0.41  India2006  2,919  5.13  Russia2005 592  1.04 
Benin2004 182  0.32  Indonesia2003  707  1.24  Rwanda2006  154  0.27 
BiH2002 171  0.3  Ireland2005  499  0.88  Senegal2007  473  0.83 
BiH2005 194  0.34  Jamaica2005  70  0.12  Serbia2003  399  0.7 
Bolivia2006 556  0.98  Jordan2006  451  0.79  Slovakia2002  163  0.29 
Botswana2006 253  0.44  Kazakhstan2002 249  0.44  Slovakia2005  208  0.37 
Bulgaria2002 245  0.43  Kazakhstan2005 578  1.02  Slovenia2002 188  0.33 
Bulgaria2005 291  0.51  Kenya2003  211  0.37  Slovenia2005  221  0.39 
BurkinaFaso2006 131 0.23  Kyrgyzstan2002  166  0.29  SouthAfrica2003 551 0.97 
Burundi2006 215  0.38  Kyrgyzstan2003  102  0.18  SouthKorea2005  594  1.04 
Cambodia2003 464  0.82  Kyrgyzstan2005 199  0.35  Spain2005  601  1.06 
Cameroon2006 165  0.29  Laos2005  225  0.4  Swaziland2006  208  0.37 
CapeVerde2006 93  0.16  Latvia2002  170  0.3  Tajikistan2002 170  0.3 
Chile2004 942  1.66  Latvia2005 200  0.35  Tajikistan2003  107  0.19 
Chile2006 962  1.69  Lebanon2006  345  0.61  Tajikistan2005  199  0.35 
Colombia2006 936  1.64  Lesotho2003  44  0.08  Tajikistan2008  316  0.56 
CostaRica2005 333  0.59  Lithuania2002  193  0.34  Tanzania2003 245  0.43 
Croatia2002 174  0.31  Lithuania2004  230  0.4  Tanzania2006  360  0.63 
Croatia2005 229  0.4  Lithuania2005  196  0.34  Turkey-b2005  1,238  2.18 
Czech2002 261  0.46  Madagascar2005 269  0.47  Turkey2002 513  0.9 
Czech2005 327  0.57  Malawi2005 150 0.26  Turkey2005  544  0.96 
DRC2006 271  0.48  Mali2003  123  0.22  Turkey2008  900  1.58 
Ecuador2003 411  0.72  Mauritania2006  204  0.36  Uganda2003 291  0.51 
Ecuador2006 592  1.04  Mauritius2005 177  0.31  Uganda2006 509  0.89 
ElSalvador2003 459  0.81  Mexico2006  1,343  2.36  Ukraine2002  463  0.81 
ElSalvador2006 620  1.09  Moldova2002  173  0.3  Ukraine2005  586  1.03 
Estonia2002 160  0.28  Moldova2003 103  0.18  Ukraine2008  733  1.29 
Estonia2005 214  0.38  Moldova2005 346  0.61  Uruguay2006  540  0.95 
FYROM2002 165  0.29  Montenegro2003  100  0.18  Uzbekistan2002  255  0.45 
FYROM2005 194  0.34  Mozambique2007  429  0.75  Uzbekistan2003  100  0.18 
Gambia2006 126  0.22  Namibia2006  242  0.43  Uzbekistan2005  298  0.52 
Georgia2002 173  0.3  Nicaragua2003  448  0.79  Uzbekistan2008  361  0.63 
Georgia2005 199  0.35  Nicaragua2006  461  0.81  Vietnam-b2005  497  0.87 
Georgia2008 325  0.57  Nigeria2007  2,005  3.52  Vietnam2005  1,109  1.95 
Germany2005 1,195  2.1  Pakistan2002  937  1.65  Zambia2002  187  0.33   42
 
Table A2: Sample Composition 
              
Region  Percent  Sector  Percent 
Sub-Sahara Africa  16.01    Textiles  5.3 
East Asia & Pacific  14.45    Leather  1.15 
East Europe & Central Asia  27.21    Garments  8.46 
Western Europe  4.57    Agroindustry  6.65 
Latin America  20.87    Beverages  7.17 
Middle East & North Africa  6.72    Metals and machinery  9.42 
South Asia  10.16    Electronics  1.55 
      Chemicals and pharmaceutics            4.9 
Income Level       Construction  5.07 
Low  31.43    Wood and furniture  5.02 
Lower-middle  44.59    Non-metallic and plastic materials     4.37 
Upper-middle 16.36    Paper  1.98 
High 7.62    IT  services 3.85 
     Other  manufacturing  1.39 
Initial size       Advertising and marketing  1.73 
Micro (1-10 employees)  39.36    Other services  7.28 
Small (11-50 employees)  33.64    Retail and wholesale trade  17.67 
Medium (51-200 employees)  16.39    Hotels and restaurants  3.41 
Large (+200 employees)  10.61    Transport  2.52 
     Mining  and  quarrying  0.46 
Initial age       Other Transport Equipment  0.67 
Young 1-5  30.71       
Mature 6-15  38.34    Labor intensive  31.69 
Older +16  30.95    Capital intensive  31.89 
     Services  36.42 
Non-exporter 77.35       
Exporter  22.65    Capital or city >=1million  35.27 
      City 500k to 1 million  13.22 
Domestic owned  88.82    City 250k-500k  15.43 
Foreign owned  11.18    City 50k-250k  17.86 
         City <50k  18.22 
 
 
 